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The Mexican revolution of 1910-1911 followed thirty-five 
years of dictatorship under Porfirio Diaz. The revolution 
culminated years of political and social unrest that had sur­
faced during the decade of 1900-1910. Revolutionary forces 
pushed for change in a variety of sectors. It would prove 
difficult for any one leader to channel all the revolutionary 
impulses into an effective post-revolutionary society.
The liberals led by Francisco Madero supported political 
reform for Mexico as their primary goal. Other undercurrents 
of revolutionary sentiment existed that went beyond a mere 
desire to reform the political system prevalent in Mexico. 
Many revolutionaries supported the ideal of economic nation­
alism. They desired that Mexico be made economically inde­
pendent of other nations and that foreign control over natu­
ral resources be terminated. Other reformers demanded an 
end to the influence of foreigners in all public affairs, an 
influence that had increased during the Diaz era. Another 
revolutionary impulse was in the direction of land reform. 
Many of the more radical revolutionaries demanded that the 
large haciendas be broken up and the property distributed to 
landless peasants,
Madero and his followers succeeded in ousting the aged
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Dî az and Madero became the new president. He failed to sat­
isfy moderate, liberal, and conservative elements both in 
and out of the revolution. Led by the Commander of the Army, 
General Victoriano Huerta, a successful coup ousted Madero 
in February, 1913. The Huerta takeover met almost instant 
opposition from elements who were either loyal to the assas­
sinated Madero or who saw in Huerta a return to the policies 
of Porfirio Diaz. Venustiano Carranza, Governor of the state 
of Coahuila, had been an ardent Madero supporter. When Ma­
dero was killed, Carranza announced his opposition to the 
new regime. In Chihuahua, the bandit leader Pancho Villa 
mounted a military campaign against the Huerta government.
To the south, the peasant leader Emiliano Zapata organized 
resistance to Huerta and demanded the restoration of lands 
which had been taken from villages during the Diaz years.
The forces under Carranza were known as the Constitu­
tionalists because they supported political reform and the 
writing of a new constitution for Mexico. Huerta struggled 
vainly to remain in office, but the three-pronged opposition 
to his regime was too powerful. He was forced to leave the 
country in 1914, and thereafter the three revolutionary 
leaders fell to fighting among themselves for control of the 
country.
The period of struggle between Carranza, Villa, and Za­
pata saw the goals of the revolution fall by the wayside.
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The conflict became a quest for personal power by each of the 
three. Few real revolutionary improvements were accomplished 
on a national scale, and revolutionary ideals became mere 
vehicles used by the leaders to garner personal support. 
Carranza viewed the problem of economic nationalism as one 
that could be exploited for his own benefit. He decided that 
he would direct a drive for economic nationalism against one 
particular foreign-dominated industry : oil.
The petroleum industry was practically controlled by 
foreigners. Carranza embarked on a struggle against the for­
eign oil companies to rescue ostensibly a valuable natural 
resource from greedy profiteers. This study will examine in 
detail the diplomatic conflict that occurred between the Car­
ranza regime and the United States government. The efforts 
made by Carranza toward achieving an independent Mexican oil 
industry during his tenure in office would have far-reaching 
ramifications for U.S.-Mexican diplomatic relations and for 
future attempts by Mexico to achieve economic independence.^
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Constitutionalist forces led by Alvaro Obregc^n marched
into Mexico City in January, 1915. Venustiano Carranza,
First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, claimed executive
2authority of Mexico without calling himself president. With 
Obregon occupying Mexico City and Carranza governing from 
Veracruz, the Constitutionalists consolidated their power 
and thus gained preeminence among the several rival factions 
then attempting to control the country. The power of the 
Constitutionalists, however, was far from absolute, and, in 
an attempt to unify the Mexican people behind his faction, 
Carranza embarked upon a course of action which he hoped 
would inspire nationalistic fervor.
Carranza remained keenly aware that exploitation of Mex­
ican resources by foreign industrialists constituted a chronic 
irritant to the Mexican populace. Such exploitation was es­
pecially apparent in the foreign-dominated oil industry. For 
that reason Carranza instituted a program whose principal 
object was the assertion of Mexican control over the rich 
oil deposits. During the years prior to the Revolution the 
Porfirian government alienated most extant deposits by grant­
ing large concessions to foreign entrepreneurs.
Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexico from 1876 to 1911. Under his
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regime, concessions had been granted to individuals and com­
panies for the purpose of locating and surveying empty lands. 
If title to the land was questionable or could not be ascer­
tained, the individual or company performing the survey 
could denounce the land. The denouncer would then receive 
as a reward title to one-third of the land and could purchase 
from the Mexican government the remaining two-thirds at what 
could only be described as a bargain price.^ As a result of 
the Mining Code of 1884, all government claims to ownership 
of subsoil properties were specifically vacated, and owner­
ship thereto was deemed vested in those who owned the surface 
l a n d . T h e  surface owner then could lease out his subsoil 
rights or explore for and produce the subsurface deposits 
himself.
In 1901, an American company brought the first oil well 
in Mexico into production, and foreign investment capital
5subsequently poured into the fledgling Mexican oil industry. 
Diaz allowed foreign oil companies to operate relatively free 
of restriction, and the industry was flourishing by the ad­
vent of the 1910 revolution and the overthrow of Diaz,
Shortly before the revolution, an attempt at reform was 
made with the amendment of the Mining Code of 1884. Mexican 
nationalists had made a concerted effort at that time to have 
all bitumens and petroleum placed under national jurisdic­
tion.^ That effort failed, but the nationalistic currents
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prevalent at that time were a prelude to the regulatory mea­
sures which would be enacted during the Carranza years.
While Mexican revolutionaries continued to disembowel 
themselves and the nation, Carranza proceeded to act presi­
dential from his refuge in Veracruz. On January 8, 1915, the 
American Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, received 
an urgent telegram from the United States Consul in Veracruz. 
Carranza had decreed the immediate cessation of all oil ex­
ploration and development until such time as foreign oil com­
panies signed pledges that they would obey any new law gov­
erning the industry. The order was punctuated with a threat 
of destruction for any operation that continued in defiance 
of the decree. Alternately, Carranza assumed the right to 
claim any well brought in after the promulgation of the de-
7cree as the property of the Mexican government.
That information failed to amuse the dour Bryan, and,
after a few days of deliberation, he dispatched a telegram to
Veracruz with instructions to the consul to protest the decree
in the name of the United States and to inform Carranza that
there would be "serious complications and consequences" if
8any American property was destroyed. Later in January, the 
United States became more overt in its resistance and made 
it clear that no U.S. company would sign any document as re­
quired under the decree which bound it to obey such vagaries
9as petroleum laws which might be enacted.
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Foreign protest and the chaotic situation prevalent in 
Mexico at that juncture prevented the enforcement of Carran­
za's decree. Therefore, none of the companies operating in 
the Tampico oil region obeyed its conditions but rather con­
tinued with business as usual. Even so, U.S. companies and 
investors became a bit jittery wondering what protections 
would be afforded them in the event Carranza attempted to con­
fiscate or destroy their oil operations. In April, 1915, 
Secretary of State Bryan assured one potential American in­
vestor that the protection given by the United States would 
be in accordance with "generally accepted rules and principles 
of international l a w . H o w e v e r ,  undaunted by U.S. postur­
ing and in spite of weak enforcement, Carranza doggedly con­
tinued to issue orders regarding the oil industry. For in­
stance, on August 14, 1915, he issued a decree ordering that 
no drilling take place within thirty meters of the boundary 
of a company's property.
Such persistence helped disseminate the spirit of eco­
nomic nationalism to local units of government. General Can­
dide Aguilar, Governor of the state of Veracruz and Carranza's 
son-in-law, echoed Carranza and ordered that no further con­
tracts for sale or lease of oil lands would take place with­
out the consent of the government of Veracruz. The order 
further stated that all persons taking part in the execution 
of contracts referred to in the decree would be considered
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Mexican subjects for that purpose and could not seek protec-
12tion from their home governments.
In light of such developments, fear grew in the United 
States that the Mexicans might take steps to nationalize the 
oil industry in their country. Newspaper reports like that 
published by the New York World in February, 1916, exacerbated 
such fears. The World claimed that Carranza was considering 
a plan to nationalize all Mexican oil property, nullifying 
concessions for the exploitation of petroleum deposits granted 
by previous administrations. Pastor Rouaix, Minister of De­
velopment in the Carranza regime, allegedly praised the plan. 
Such reports, however, turned out to be mere panic-mongering 
as Carranza, on February 28, 1916, simply ordered suspension
of all oil operations pending the issuance of a new petroleum
14exploration law. But rumors continued to fly, and in May 
of that year it was reported that the Mexicans were preparing 
another decree that would revise the tax laws pertaining to 
the production of p e t r o l e u m . I n  fact, no new tax law was 
forthcoming that year, with the minor exception of a decree, 
issued September 4, 1916, which required all oil companies 
in Mexico to register with the tax bureau by September 15.^^
As usual, the oil companies refused to obey those orders.
Oil operators' defiance of national government edicts 
proved no great risk, for Carranza's forces did not control 
the major oil-producing regions. The area around Tampico and
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Tuxpan was in the hands of a minor rebel chief, Manuel Pel- 
aez, a some-time Villista general opposed to the Carranza 
regime. Pelaez was part of a family which controlled exten­
sive tracts of oil-bearing land around Tampico. His army
was estimated to include 4,000 to 6,500 local residents, wor-
17kers, and pistoleros.
In 1916, the oil companies operating within Pelaez* 
territory began paying tribute to the general to insure his 
good will and invite protection against possible action by 
the Carranza government. In August, 1916, the U.S. State 
Department was informed by its consul in Tampico that Pelaez 
wished an understanding with American authorities under which 
he would afford guarantees for the protection of U.S. proper­
ties in return for assistance in the form of supplies and
18ammunition ostensibly to carry on his resistance movement.
The Pelaez rebellion was not without support in U.S. 
government circles. For example, William P. Buckley, an in­
dependent oil producer, described the Carranza regime as a 
"rotten bunch," and wrote also that "the sincerest desire of 
General Pelaez and his subordinates has always been to bring 
about a speedy disappearance of all differences between Mex­
icans." Buckley urged that all Americans support Pel/ez and 
he proposed that a treaty be forced upon Mexico wherein the 
Mexicans would formally recognize the Monroe Doctrine and ex­
pressly acknowledge the rights of property acquired by U.S.
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citizens in M e x i c o . T h a t  reactionary idea did not prevail.
As 1916 drew to a close, the legal status of foreign
oil companies operating in Mexico remained uncertain. In
November, the Department of Development issued a statement
which declared all permits, laws, decrees, and leases previ-
2 0ously issued by local governments null and void. Enforcing 
such a decree was another matter. Oil companies steadfastly 
resisted Carranza's edicts and paid tribute to the unpredict­
able Pelaez. The U.S. State Department repeatedly sought 
clarification of the situation, but assurances, when there 
were any from Carranza, were vague and subject to sudden 
change, always susceptible to alterations by orders issued 
at lower levels of the Mexican government.
Up until 1917, the Carranza regime had little substantive 
base for its decrees. That situation changed with the prom­
ulgation, in early 1917, of the new Mexican Constitution, 
for that document contained a revolutionary provision concern­
ing ownership of subsoil properties. Article 27 provided 
that the Mexican nation held direct dominion over all subsoil 
deposits, including petroleum. National ownership of those 
deposits was deemed "inalienable and imprescriptable," and 
concessions for exploration could be granted only by the na­
tional government. Further, anyone wishing to extract minerals
21had to agree to operate under Mexican law.
Article 27 horrified foreign investors holding properties
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or leases in Mexico, for it raised the awesome specter of
outright nationalization or expropriation of their holdings.
To add to their consternation, El Universal, a Mexico City
newspaper, in February, 1917, published an article entitled
"Statements of the Chief Clerk of the Ministry of Development
on the Nationalization of Petroleum." The article declared
that all hydrocarbons had come under the direct control of
the Mexican government because of the operation of Article 
2227. Worried U.S. oilmen, in response to rumors of possible 
action by the Mexican government, made repeated queries to 
the State Department regarding their status with the Mexican 
government. No answer came until June, 1917.
A report was received by the Secretary of State that no 
well drilled after the promulgation of the new Constitution 
would be officially sanctioned by the Mexican government be­
cause no permission had been obtained by oilmen to drill as 
required under Article 27. Apparently, U.S. oilmen had assumed 
that the new Constitution would not take effect until May 1, 
1917, the date it was to become law, and they had hurriedly 
drilled wells in order to beat the effective deadline. It 
came as a nasty blow when Carranza stated that the basic pro­
hibitions had come into effect on February 5, the date on
which the document was published and thereby became public 
23knowledge. Carranza took no punitive action as to those 
wells drilled between February 5 and May 1, in that no prop­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
erty was confiscated and no drilling operation halted, for 
he lacked the necessary power to do so. However, the publi­
cation of the new Constitution did serve to legitimize his 
regulatory efforts.
In April, 1917, the government of the United States, 
under increasing pressure internationally, made a decision 
which would markedly affect its diplomatic attitude toward 
Mexico. War was declared on Germany and the United States 
joined the Allied war effort. In World War I, the first war 
in which petroleum products played a major strategic role, 
the problem of keeping oil flowing from whatever source was 
paramount. A cutoff of Mexican oil, it was feared, might 
result in a serious impairment of the Allied war effort. The 
U.S. State Department had the ominous responsibility of pro­
tecting and promoting a steady supply of oil.
In February, 1917, the United States had sent Ambassador 
Henry P. Fletcher to Mexico, the first ambassador sent there 
subsequent to American ^  facto recognition of the Carranza 
government in October, 1915. Anticipating involvement in 
Europe, the State Department had instructed Ambassador Flet­
cher to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza. 
He was to improve relations if that could be done but to defer 
consideration of the problem of Article 27 until the war in 
Europe was over. The ambassador later noted, "During the 
war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done.
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Fletcher pursued a moderate course diplomatically. With 
regard to the various decrees and statements issued sporad­
ically by the Mexican government, Fletcher adopted a policy 
that amounted essentially to a juggling act, wherein the in­
terests of the United States, U.S. oil companies, and the Car­
ranza regime were held in abeyance. On one occasion, in the 
month of April, 1917, Carranza issued a decree which levied 
an export tax of 10 percent on all Mexican petroleum products. 
The oil companies insisted that the tax was illegal, for 
they had received concessions under ufaz which exempted them 
from such taxes. The State Department urged Fletcher to ex­
ert some pressure for revocation of the tax decree. The am­
bassador, however, noting that the Mexican government needed 
revenue and further that taxes on foreign oil interests were 
locally popular, requested reconsideration of the instruct­
ions. Forced to realize the patent absurdity of risking a 
break with Mexico just for the windfall benefit of a few self- 
serving interests (the price of oil having skyrocketed due to 
the European war), the State Department mitigated its position 
and instead suggested that the oil companies pay the tax un­
der protest while the U.S. government reserved the right to
2 5protest in the future. Thus, Fletcher's temperate hand 
averted a showdown with Carranza over the tax issue.
Foreign oil companies' lust for profit was not easily 
thwarted, and the existence of Pel/ez provided a possible
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avenue of resistance to the regulatory measures of the Car­
ranza government. By aiding Pelaez, some oil companies hoped 
to circumvent the authority of the Mexican national govern­
ment, mollycoddled they thought by the U.S. government, and 
perhaps even contribute to the downfall of Carranza. Such 
subversive sentiments, however, generated paranoia, as is of­
ten the case, and in the United States rampant rumors circu­
lated that Carranza would take action to wrest control of the 
oil region from Pelaez.
The situation being what it was, all reports reaching 
the United States that concerned conditions within the Mexican 
oil regions were carefully examined. In January, 1917, a 
report reached Washington, D.C., relating that Pelaez had de­
manded heavy tribute from oil companies for their protection, 
threatening to destroy their facilities if they refused com­
pliance.^^ On February 3, 1917, the Secretary of State re­
ceived a document from the Secretary of the Navy which con­
tained a copy of a report relayed by the U .S.S. Illinois. 
Evidently, Pelaez was collecting $5,000 per month from one
oil company operating at Tuxpan, and amazingly, some oil com-
2 7panics were paying up to $10,000 per month in tribute I To 
be sure, the almost medieval situation under Pelaez turned 
out to be at least as odious to the oil companies as the pol­
icies put forth by Carranza.
In light of that high-tension situation, the paranoia
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of the oil companies operating in Mexico seemed justified, 
for they were walking a tightrope, risking the wrath of Pel­
aez if leaning to one side, the enmity of Carranza if leaning 
to the other. Carranza, of course, knew of the tribute being 
paid to Pelaez, but interpreted that to mean the United States 
government was directly aiding Pelaez in order to destabilize 
the Constitutionalist regime. Although he did not move to 
take the oil fields, having been blackmailed with the threat 
of destruction of the fields, Carranza's belief in a conspir­
acy involving the U.S. government and Pelaez enraged him and 
served to weaken the already-tenuous relationship between 
the United States and Mexico. The American government was 
thus increasingly drawn into the same precarious position as 
the oil companies operating under its auspices. Ambassador 
Fletcher therefore was to have an ever more difficult time 
conducting smooth diplomatic relations amidst that tangle of 
interests.
Fletcher did, however, hold a trump card, the prospect 
of ^  jure, or full legal recognition of the Carranza regime 
by the United States government. Fletcher knew that such 
recognition would mean much to Carranza, as it would add le­
gitimacy to the Constitutionalist regime in an international 
sense. Playing that card, Fletcher requested and received
assurances from Carranza that there would be no confiscation
2 8of foreign-owned properties in Mexico under Article 27.
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On the basis of those assurances. Ambassador Fletcher recom­
mended ^  jure recognition be extended to Mexico. President
2 9Wilson granted it on August 31, 1917. The ambassador’s
trust proved to be at the time well-placed, for in September
Carranza expressed disapproval of a proposed petroleum law.
This law would have claimed indisputable direct Mexican con-
31trol of that country’s petroleum.
The United States held another trump card, a point of 
leverage that it curiously failed to utilize. In January, 
1917, General Zambrano, Carranza’s brother-in-law, had ap­
proached the Morgan Bank of New York City requesting a loan 
for Mexico. He was informed that no credit could be extended
until the Mexicans in some way had undertaken to protect for-
32eigners in their persons and property. In full knowledge
of Mexico’s failure to obtain a private loan, the State De­
partment, in October, 1917, seeking to gain an advantage in 
oil negotiations with Mexico, encouraged the Mexican govern­
ment to approach the American government itself for a loan. 
Carranza refused to borrow from the U.S. government, for he 
held it responsible for Mexico’s inability to garner a loan 
from private sources. Fred I. Kent of the Federal Reserve 
Board suggested that an ultimatum be delivered to Carranza
demanding that Mexico either join the Allies and request a
33loan or submit to intervention. Such an aggressive policy 
was never pursued, but, then again, neither was a more
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14
moderate, reasonable policy. The matter was simply dropped.
Although the United States refused to intervene directly 
in the affairs of Mexico in late 1917, its powers of persua­
sion in domestic matters proved considerable. In September, 
an article was published in Prensa which indicated that 
an attempt would soon be made by the Constitutionalist army 
to subdue the oil-producing regions. By December, reports
circulated that the Constitutionalists were assembling 25,000
35soldiers at Tampico. Edward L. Doheny, one of the major 
American holders of Mexican oil property, urged Ambassador
Fletcher to try to dissuade Carranza from undertaking the
3 6rumored invasion. Fearing that such an invasion would have 
a disastrous effect on the flow of oil to the Allies, Flet­
cher did so, and the invasion never materialized.
The year 1918 heralded the end of the tenuous equilibrium 
carefully maintained by the oil companies and the Constitu­
tionalists during the previous years. Renewed Mexican efforts 
to implement Article 27 would produce a flare-up in tension 
in U.S.-Mexican relations and would spark vehement calls for 
intervention in Mexico by U.S. interests.
The first hint of the oncoming storm came in January,
1918, when the Governor of Veracruz ordered that concessions 
to products of the subsoil granted S. Pearson and Son, Limited, 
a British oil company, be declared null and void. All rights 
granted by the concessions were to revert to the state of
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3 7Veracruz, To make matters worse, it had come to the atten­
tion of the U.S. State Department that several U.S. oil com­
panies had been refused permission to drill on lands which 
they held in Mexico; that, apparently, in consequence of an 
opinion issued by the Attorney General of Mexico. His opin­
ion was that Article 27 forbade any exploitation whatsoever
3 8of Mexican resources by foreign companies. The U.S. State 
Department informed Ambassador Fletcher of its displeasure 
over these developments and he in turn discussed the matter 
with Mexican authorities. Alberto J. Pani, Minister of In- 
distry, assured the ambassador that foreign companies were 
not forbidden to operate in Mexico but that they had to sub­
mit to any new petroleum laws, organize as Mexican companies,
39and renounce the protection of their home governments.
On February 19, 1918, the storm broke. Carranza issued 
a decree on that date which set new taxes on all petroleum 
lands. The decree levied a graduated tax from 10 to 50 per­
cent on annual rental fees paid lessors, established a flat 
tax of 5 percent on all royalties paid by the lessee to the 
lessor, and created various other petroleum-related taxes
based on lands which were owned outright by the oil companies
40on which no rental had to be paid. The oilmen were to re­
mit the tax dollars to the landowner who in turn would pay 
the money to the Mexican government. To allow implementa­
tion of the decree, registration of all land titles was required
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In the eyes of the oilmen, such a complex and hard-to- 
administer taxation scheme was bad enough, but the concession 
provisions of the decree proved intolerable. In addition to 
its taxation provisions, the decree pronounced state owner­
ship of all oil deposits and provided further that private 
parties wishing to extract those deposits had to apply for 
government permission. If such application was not made, the 
leaseholder would lose his rights and a third party could lay 
claim to the land after a certain period. A prominent 
Mexican scholar observed that "the decree of February, 1918, 
attempted nothing less than to change the land titles granted 
during the Porfirian administration to mere concessions."^^
Eight days after the decree was issued, the U.S. Secre­
tary of State wired Fletcher that U.S. oil interests were 
notably perturbed. The oil barons claimed that the new de­
cree would wreck their operations at Tampico, paralyze U.S. 
industries engaged in war contracts, and cause serious inter­
ference with Allied naval operations thereby. The Secretary 
urged the ambassador to get a thirty-day suspension of the 
decree in order that the U.S. government might examine it 
on behalf of its nationals.
Believing that compliance with the decree amounted to
legal acceptance of Article 27 with all its implications,
many oil companies refused even to register land titles with
45the Mexican government. Even Ambassador Fletcher urged
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that Allied oil interests adopt a unified stance in opposition 
to the decree. In a move that seemed to reflect a shift away 
from moderate policy, Fletcher issued an opinion which claimed 
a concerted effort would have to be made by Britain and the 
U.S. against Mexico should the latter, in order to compel 
compliance with the decree, refuse clearance at port for oil 
tankers,
On April 2, the State Department, still without assur­
ances from Carranza, dispatched a strongly-worded note of 
protest directly to the First Chief. The U.S. accused Mex­
ico of outright confiscation and warned of "the necessity 
which may arise to impel it [the U.S. government] to protect 
the property of its citizens in Mexico divested or injuriously 
affected by the decree above c i t e d . A w a r e  of the need for 
a united front, British and American oil interests operating
in Mexico, in order to channel their efforts more effectively,
4 8formed the Association of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico.
The organization appointed representatives to go to Mexico 
for negotiations concerning the new decree. American threats 
and industry negotiators had, however, little effect, at 
least overtly.
Although by mid-1918 foreign oil interests had adopted 
a quite aggressive posture toward the Constitutionalist re­
gime, they could not remain too closely allied to Pelaez.
In the face of a resurgence in Carranza's efforts to gain
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
control of the oil fields, Pelaez had increased his demands 
for tribute from the oil companies and backed his demands 
with harassment of oil operations. His forays took the form
of minor irritations, such as cutting water lines and blowing
49 /up bridges. However, Pelaez was no fool and did not seek
to destroy the actual source of his power.
As 1918 wore on, anti-American sentiment in Mexico grew, 
due largely to America's increasingly antagonistic attitude
and Carranza's flagrant nationalism. To allay Mexican antag­
onism, the United States softened its stance toward Mexico.
In May, the Federal Reserve Board approved a request by Gen­
eral Obregon for importation of 4.3 million dollars in gold, 
silver, and currency into M e x i c o . O t h e r  trade deals were 
made and the U.S. Food Administration worked to relax the 
despised export controls on certain food commodities. On 
June 7, President Wilson delivered a speech to a carefully- 
chosen group of Mexican newspaper editors. He stressed good 
relations between Mexico and the United States, claiming that
the only goal of the U.S. vis-à-vis Mexico was "disinterested
,,51 service."
By adopting the soft approach, the Wilson administration 
hoped to woo Carranza into delaying or cancelling the worri­
some decree of February 19. In July, reports of new confis­
catory laws reached the United States, making modification 
of Mexican policy, especially the decree of February 19, more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
imperative. Circular Number 6, issued by the Department of
Industry, cancelled permits for sinking oil wells in the
event work had not begun within six months of the date of
permit issuance, or if work had not been completed within one
year of the date of issuance. The circular further provided
that such properties could be denounced by third parties who
5 2could then lay claim to the property.
Late in July, at the suggestion of the State Department, 
Carranza agreed to extend the registration period of the de­
cree by fifteen days. On August 12, he issued an order which 
seemed to withdraw the requirement that land titles be reg­
istered. The order of August 12 also stated that, concerning 
oil claims which had been surveyed and in which capital had
already been invested, no third party denouncement could take 
53place. One authority asserts that the order of August 12 
effectively cancelled the implementation of the decree of 
February 19 until the end of World War The Wilson
•'soft” policy gave foreign oil interests a respite from na­
tionalist pressure.
Foreign oil interests, however, continued wary. Though 
the spirit of Mexican nationalism had been waylaid, it was 
far from dead. Evidence of its vitality surfaced in Carran­
za's presidential report of September 10, 1918. He outlined 
his so-called Carranza doctrine upon which he would base fu­
ture policy regarding the oil industry and which echoed the
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nationalist sentiment of his revolutionary regime. The doc­
trine stated first that all countries were equal and should 
respect each other's laws, institutions, and sovereignty. 
Second, no country should in any way interfere with the in­
ternal affairs of another. Further, Carranza postulated that 
no individual or company should, on the basis of foreign sta­
tus, claim a superior position to that of the people of the 
country in which such foreign interests operated. Nationals 
and aliens should be equal under the laws of the host nation. 
Last, the Carranza doctrine stated that legislation should 
grant equal protection where at all possible and make dis­
tinction based on nationality only when the exercise of na-
55tional sovereignty was involved.
The Carranza doctrine spelled trouble for foreign oil 
companies. Under its provisos Carranza could claim that the 
decrees and laws of his regime were completely equitable for 
they applied to both Mexicans and foreigners alike. In short, 
Mexico had the right to make any laws concerning any activity 
occurring on her soil, regardless, and the rights of foreign­
ers were subordinate to Mexican sovereignty.
The relatively stable atmosphere of late 1918, which had 
largely been a result of U.S. softline policy, disintegrated 
with the coming of the new year. On January 8, 1919, the 
State Department received information concerning a decree 
issued by Carranza on December 27, 1918. The decree, while
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not reversing the order of August 12, 1918, extended the per­
iod in which denouncement of oil lands by third parties could 
be made. The extension was to last up until the Mexican Con­
gress could enact a new petroleum law.^^ Oil operators nat­
urally were concerned about the renewed possibility of losing 
concessions by denouncement, but the Mexican government took 
no action to enforce the decree and, as usual, it served only 
to inflame passions.
Oil company discomfiture was only the beginning. The 
Mexicans threatened new actions with different pronouncements 
and rumors thereof emanating from various sources in a veri­
table flood. In March, Minister of Finance Luis Cabrera was 
quoted by another Mexican official as saying that Mexico did 
not intend to make Article 27 retroactive; that oil, mining,
and other interests acquired prior to the promulgation of
5 7the Constitution of 1917 would be protected. Yet only a 
few days later, the Department of Industry issued a circular 
that threatened to punish companies and individuals that had 
continued drilling wells in defiance of that infamous decree
c o
of January 7, 1915. Such contradictory statements and 
"assurances” from different levels of the Mexican government 
attested to a gross lack of cohesion concerning oil policy 
in Mexico. The random nature of oil administration by the 
Mexican government strained the nerves of foreign oil exec­
utives and contributed much to the growing instability of 1919.
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The lax enforcement of its decrees by the central gov­
ernment had been a balm to the troubled foreign oil interests. 
Words by themselves had little clout. But by early April, 
1919, clearly Mexico had become more aggressive. At that 
time, the Huasteca Petroleum Company complained of harass­
ment, citing several examples where it and other companies 
had been refused permits to drill. Evidently, on January 30, 
1919, the Tampico oil inspector sent word to the International 
Petroleum Company that it had to apply for a new drilling per­
mit for an oil well already in process of being drilled. In 
addition, on August 24, 1918, the Chief Inspector at Tampico 
allegedly had refused an application for a drilling permit 
by the Transcontinental Petroleum C o m p a n y . T h o s e  and other 
such actions fueled anti-Mexican sentiment in the United 
States.
Early in 1919, the conclusion of World War I allowed 
American politicos to turn away from Europe and look towards 
matters nearer home. Outraged by the effrontery of the Mex­
ican government, an organization called the National Associa­
tion for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico began a 
campaign to force adoption of hardline policy towards Mexico. 
Congress became a forum for hot debate over that issue, and 
people such as Senator Albert B. Fall and Norman J. Gould 
were the major exponents of outright intervention.^^ Con­
gressional debate was initiated with the intent of arousing
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public opinion, and speeches, resolutions, and hearings on 
the Mexican problem were prevalent throughout the Congress­
ional year.
Senate investigators heard inflammatory testimony con­
cerning losses by American oil companies. J. D. Lester tes­
tified that carrancista soldiers, stationed at Palo Blanco, 
had consumed meals valued at 4,500 pesos in the mess hall of 
one American company without paying for the food. He cited 
other instances where Carranza's forces had commandeered 
horses and mules from Americans in the Tampico region, and 
he stated that during the second half of 1917, five American 
oil company employees had been murdered in Mexico.
Apparently in response to the vituperative mood in the 
U.S. Congress, Carranza changed his tack and concentrated his 
efforts only on the licensing of new oil wells. It was an­
nounced that companies wishing to drill any well commenced 
after the promulgation of the Mexican Constitution had to 
obtain a permit which could only be obtained after the appli­
cant registered title with the Mexican government and prom­
ised to accept the Organic Law on Petroleum when it was en-
f \ 9acted. It would appear however that other factors were 
taken into account in the licensing process, for Panuco Bos­
ton was refused a permit to drill a new well because of al­
leged non-compliance with previous decrees issued by Carran-
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Some companies, having refused to abide by the decree's 
provisions, simply stopped drilling, but others, especially 
recalcitrant, continued to work in spite of the decree. In 
response to such resistance, the Mexican government threat­
ened confiscation of the property involved if work continued 
withou federal permission. That action was to take place by 
and under the authority of the ancient and radical decree of 
January 7, 1915.^^ Carranza himself pronounced that Article 
2 7 would remain unamended and that Mexico would not sacrifice 
her national wealth to placate foreign petroleum interests.
On May 1, 1919, Carranza addressed the opening session 
of the Mexican Congress. He informed the assembled legisla­
tors that he would propose a bill which would, in accordance 
with the Carranza doctrine, equalize the legal status of Mex­
ican and foreign petroleum i n t e r e s t s . T h a t  portion of the 
Carranza doctrine was an application of the Calvo doctrine, 
named after an Argentine scholar, diplomat, and commentator 
on international law. Calvo had proposed that foreign resi­
dents and companies be subject to the same laws and judicial 
process as the citizens of the country in which business was 
carried on. Foreign businesses were to be treated as if 
they were locally owned.
To facilitate a smooth phase-in of the law which would 
most probably follow Carranza's latest proposal. Minister of 
Finance Cabrera arranged for the establishment of a system
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whereby the Department of Industry would issue provisional 
permits for the drilling of new wells subject to the relevant 
legislation pending in the Mexican C o n g r e s s . H o w e v e r ,  Cab­
rera, in early June, informed U.S. authorities that no pro­
visional permits could be issued until the return to Mexico 
of General Calles, the Secretary of I n d u s t r y . I n  mid-June, 
the U.S. Secretary of State, then Robert F. Lansing, was in­
formed that the Sub-Secretary of Industry had relayed a new
Carranza order. All drilling operations were to immediately
7 0cease where permits had not been obtained. Huasteca Petro­
leum Company shortly reported that on May 16, 1919, Carranza 
had issued an order directing the Mexican War Department to 
send troops to the oil regions. Drilling and construction
work being done by foreign interests without permit was to 
71be stopped.
Soon a deluge of reports reflecting iron-handed tactics
hit the United States. The Mexican army shut down drilling
operations indiscriminately. A senior American official
wired the U.S. Secretary of the Navy that soldiers were placed
on the property of Atlantic Refinery Company on June 10.
7 2Drilling was stopped. Many other such cases were reported 
and U.S. oilmen clamored for armored intervention.
The State Department strongly protested Mexican tactics 
and applied pressure to Carranza to issue provisional permits. 
Cabrera responded with general agreement but emphasized the
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provisional nature of the permits. He also stated that the
oil companies had to agree that new wells would be subject
to any future legislation. The Mexicans desired assurances
that wells drilled after the promulgation of the Constitution
of 1917 would fall under some measure of regulation as per 
73Article 27. On July 2, it was confirmed that Carranza had
authorized issuance of provisional permits provided the ap­
plicants agreed to abide by future legislation.^^ There were 
no further shutdowns.
Unbelievably, the oil companies, conjuring up the ghost 
of D^az, refused to accept the condition for issuance of the 
permits, claiming to do so would undermine property rights 
which had been acquired in the bygone Porfirian era. Pres­
sures grew stronger for armed intervention, and U.S.-Mexican 
relations again deteriorated. "American Legion posts, the 
Governor of Texas, oil company representatives, and some con­
suls in Mexico," writes Robert Freeman Smith, "joined in the 
clamor stimulated by the National Association for the Protec­
tion of American Rights in Mexico and congressional interven- 
7 Stionists." Yet the calls for intervention did not consti­
tute a major public movement, for the general public was more 
interested in the European peace treaty process and President 
Wilson's efforts to get the treaty ratified.
When at last a petroleum bill came before the Mexican 
Congress, oil industry lobbyists flocked to the Mexican cap­
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itol, hoping to work with officials in shaping the law which 
would ultimately implement Article 27. In August, the Chief 
of the Petroleum Bureau of the Department of Industry announced 
that the bureau considered Mexican oil to be the property of 
the Mexican n a t i o n . C h a g r i n e d  by that opinion, petroleum 
producers pushed a weak bill which would have recognized all 
rights "heretofore legally acquired in petroleum lands," de­
clared Article 27 non-retroactive, and abrogated the decrees
7 7and orders of 1918. The bill was opposed by Carranza and 
met with an easy defeat in the Mexican Senate.
The Senate shortly thereafter began consideration of a 
much tougher bill proposed by the executive branch. That bill 
contained provisions repugnant to oil interests and was bit­
terly opposed by them. When one chamber of the Mexican Con­
gress, the Senate, passed the Executive Petroleum Bill on
December 8, 1919, any hope of a compromise seemingly evapor-
7 8ated. The Mexican legislature was no panacea for foreign 
oil interests.
As oil companies had stubbornly resisted the provisional 
permit system, anticipating legislative relief, in November, 
shortly before passage of the executive bill, Carranza ordered 
further drilling operation shutdowns. The Association of 
American Petroleum Producers, alarmed that several wells had 
been ordered closed, was shaken when it learned that troops 
had entered the Tuxpan district under the guidance of a gov-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
eminent petroleum inspector. Work at some wells was forcibly
7 9suspended, and a chaotic situation ensued. The New York 
Times reported that James Wallace, an employee of an American 
oil company operating near Tampico, was shot and killed on
o n
November 26, 1919, by carrancista soldiers.
The situation provoked massive protests by oil companies
involved in Mexico, sending reverberations through the halls
of the U.S. State Department. A petition, protesting the
confiscatory decrees and legislation, signed by a number of
American oil executives, was sent to the State Department and
Congress shortly after the Mexican Senate passed the Executive
Petroleum Bill. The signatories appealed for protection
against Mexican action which had forced them to stop drilling
81on lands which they owned or leased. The companies com­
plained that the Mexicans were acting in a discriminatory 
manner toward U.S. interests.
There was in fact quite a body of evidence to support 
the claim of discrimination. As early as May 16, 1919, as 
mentioned above, Carranza had issued an order directing his
troops to stop drilling operations on property belonging to
8 2U.S. and other foreign interests. In apparent contradic­
tion to the Carranza doctrine, no mention was made regarding 
domestic operations in that order. Further, there was evi­
dence of partisan dealing. The Association of Petroleum Pro­
ducers in Mexico informed the Secretary of State that its
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members were being prevented from drilling even though the 
British-owned Mexican oil company, El Aguila, was permitted 
to continue its operations. The true outrage was that El 
Aguila had not complied with decrees and orders of the Carran­
za regime any more than had U.S. firms and had refused to pay
8 3taxes on rents and royalties or file titles to its lands.
Such Mexican preference for the British clearly demonstrated 
to U.S. entrepreneurs that Carranza openly pursued a policy 
of discrimination.
By January, 1920, the situation had grown intolerable 
for oil operators in Mexico. Saltwater was flooding many of 
the suspended wells, necessitating the drilling of new adja­
cent wells, an expensive process. Worse, permits for such
wells could not be obtained without submission to the abhor-
84rent requirements of the provisional permit system. C. N. 
Whitehead, federal manager of the U.S. Railroad Administra­
tion for the Southwestern District, complained that harass­
ment of U.S. oil producers in Mexico interfered with delivery
Q r
of oil to railroads in Texas. The results of Mexican oil 
policy were striking closer to home.
In the middle of January, 1920, the Association of Amer­
ican Petroleum Producers in Mexico made a direct appeal to 
President Carranza. Virtually begging him to issue provis­
ional permits, the association members pledged they would be 
"willing to accept provisional permits valid until Congress
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passes the relative Organic law, provided the acceptance or 
use of such permits will not destroy or prejudice such rights 
as they may have. . With that, the companies had gone
as far as pride and self-interest would allow, by seeming 
acceptance of the provisional permit system with a tacit es­
cape provision. The essential underlying request was that 
U.S. oil companies be granted permits under the same condi­
tions given the British. El Aguila had been granted permits
with the understanding that property rights previously ac-
8 7quired would not be injured.
Carranza accepted the proposed settlement, and Robert 
Lansing was instructed as to the conditions under which the 
provisional permits would be issued. The permits would be 
valid only until the Mexican Congress finally enacted the 
Organic law implementing Article 27. Permits would be neces­
sary for any well started since May 1, 1917, whether or not 
the well had been completed. In addition, the issuance of 
the permits could not in any way be interpreted to deny the 
Mexican government sustained rights or judicial principles. 
Further, the oil companies acquired no new rights by permit, 
and it was made quite clear that privileges under the per­
mits could be revoked if companies failed to comply with the 
Organic law when it was enacted. Last, issues that were pend­
ing in the Mexican courts vis-a-vis the application of Art­
icle 27 and relevant executive decrees, and oil legislation
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in Congress, were not to be at all affected by the existence
8 8of the permit system. Oilmen knew they were trapped and 
grudgingly accepted those conditions.
The settlement with Carranza temporarily smoothed U.S.- 
Mexican relations without specifically addressing a single 
crucial issue. However, the agreement, which was more form 
than substance, enabled both U.S. oil companies and the Car­
ranza government to save face. Secretly, oilmen hoped the 
arrangement would become permanent with the election of a 
more friendly Mexican government.
Despite his efforts, Carranza had not been able to assert 
effective national control of Mexican natural resources, but 
he was still regarded as an enemy by foreign interests because 
of his strident advocacy of nationalism. Worry over the pos­
sibility of outright nationalization of natural resources was 
laid to rest, albeit temporarily, when Carranza was killed 
in May, 1920, in a revolt led by General Obregc/n. The interim 
government leader, Adolfo de la Huerta, wanted to assert con­
trol over the subsoil but he also desired cordial relations 
with the United States. To that end, negotiations were un­
dertaken with the U.S. concerning diplomatic recognition of 
the new government. Senator Fall, of the infamous Fall Com­
mittee investigating Mexican affairs, urged that the United 
States, as a requisite for recognition, impose a treaty on 
the new Mexican government, which treaty would exempt U.S.
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O Qcitizens from the application of Article 27.
President de la Huerta sent representatives to negotiate
for recognition, but the American government attached a list
of conditions which made it difficult for Mexico to attain
the desired diplomatic status. The conditions included a
promise to protect foreign lives and property, a pledge that
Article 27 would not be applied retroactively, and a host of
90Other stipulations. With that, it became clear that de la 
Huerta would not get what he wanted, for negotiations faltered 
and diplomatic recognition was not granted.
Domestic developments actually determined the degree to 
which de la Huerta might succeed diplomatically. The interim 
government was moving ahead with measures to promote national 
control over oil resources. In August, 1920, the Department 
of Industry issued Circular Number 10, which fixed general 
conditions under which concessions for oil exploration in so- 
called federal zones would be granted. Such zones were de­
fined as including strips twenty meters wide along all streams
from the high water mark, and, if the stream was large enough
to be navigated by raft, ten meters more in w i d t h . O i l  
companies owning or leasing such land adjacent to streams 
denied the right of the Mexican government to create such 
federal zones. With that failure. President de la Huerta
lost all chance of getting what he wanted.
/ /
By the time Alvaro Obregon ascended to the presidency
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in December, 1920, nothing concerning the oil issue or dip­
lomatic recognition had been settled with the United States. 
President Wilson had insisted on at least two conditions for 
diplomatic recognition, conditions which the Mexicans would 
not accept. First, the Mexicans had to recognize their ob­
ligations under international law which included protection 
of life, property, and the guarantee of payment of just 
claims for compensation of damages done to foreign-held prop­
erty. Second, Article 27 could not be made retroactive to
92the extent that it abrogated duly acquired rights. Oil 
had once again caused a rift in U.S.-Mexican relations.
The Carranza years were characterized by changeable po­
sitions. Mexico would push for control over her subsoil prop' 
erties, and then retreat in the face of strong protests by 
foreign governments, especially the United States. Although 
Carranza had managed to obtain full diplomatic recognition 
by the United States, experience with his regime hardened 
U.S. negotiators, and no diplomatic recognition of a Mexican 
government would be forthcoming for three years after his 
death. The negotiators had learned not to easily surrender 
the potent bargaining chip of diplomatic recognition, and 
would strive in the future to attain a more specific agree­
ment with Mexico before again extending recognition.
The oil problem would continue to plague Mexico until 
1938, when it was solved by total expropriation under then
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President Lazare Cardenas. In the meantime, the basic issue 
of national ownership of subsoil products and property would 
be glossed over by temporary agreements. Carranza had been 
the first Mexican president to wrestle with the problem and 
had established precedent for the "balancing technique," 
characterized by alternating pressure, reaction, and temporary 
settlement of the oil problem. That legacy would effect, 
however inefficiently, the transition from Porfirian neo­
colonialism to the radical nationalism of President Cardenas.
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